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Improving the Integration of
Restoration and Conservation in
Marine and Coastal Ecosystems:
Lessons from the Deepwater Horizon
Disaster
RICHARD L. WALLACE, SHERRYL GILBERT, AND JOHN E. REYNOLDS III

In the wake of the Deepwater Horizon disaster, much has been learned about the biological, ecological, physical, and chemical conditions of the
Gulf of Mexico. In parallel, the research community has also gained insight about the social and organizational structures and processes necessary
for oil spill response and subsequent marine and coastal restoration. However, even with these lessons from both the Deepwater Horizon and
previous spills, including 1989’s Exxon Valdez and the Ixtoc 1 in 1979, our understanding of how to avoid future crises has not advanced at
the same pace as offshore oil and gas development. We argue that this progress deficit indicates a continued devaluing of marine and coastal
resources. We believe that we must, instead, advance a proactive conservation ethic based on the precautionary principle and an appropriately
placed burden of proof—strategies that will help reduce our reliance on costly restoration and protect marine and coastal ecosystems.
Keywords: Conservation, restoration, precautionary principle, burden of proof, Gulf of Mexico, Deepwater Horizon, Exxon Valdez

T

here is still much to learn about marine and coastal
conservation from the April 2010 Deepwater Horizon
(DWH) disaster. Following the oil drilling platform’s failure,
subsequent blowout, and release of 200 million gallons of oil
over 87 days, the National Commission on the BP Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling conducted an
8-month review that produced recommendations on disaster response, tighter regulations, and the US oil and gas drilling program on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS; National
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and
Offshore Drilling 2011a). The OCS drilling program is
managed jointly by the Department of the Interior’s Bureau
of Safety and Environmental Enforcement and Bureau
of Ocean Energy Management. Both are relatively new
agencies, created from the former Minerals Management
Service (MMS). Their management is governed by federal
laws and regulations, including required mandates under
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Oil
Pollution Act, and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.
Following its review, the national commission concluded

that the federal and industry safety measures were overmatched by the technical complexity of the DWH disaster.
In addition, the commission found that “the breakdown of
the environmental review process for OCS activities was systemic and that the [Department of the Interior’s] approach
to the application of NEPA requirements in the offshore
oil and gas context needs significant revision.” (National
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and
Offshore Drilling 2011b: 18).
The commission noted that MMS made several critical strategic errors, such as failing to train personnel
with the appropriate technical skills to conduct oversight
reviews, providing insufficient guidance prior to approving operations, cutting corners on required NEPA reviews,
rationalizing the exclusion of deep water drilling from
other regulatory requirements, undertaking environmental
reviews at inappropriately large geographic scales, and using
the categorical exclusion in bad faith (CEQ 2010, Alexander
2011, National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon
Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling 2011a, 2011b, 2011c). These
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errors and associated risks are compounded by the density of
oil and gas development in the Gulf (figure 1), the agency’s
lack of precaution in its operations, and a misplaced regulatory burden of proof in oil and gas development in which
MMS—not industry—was required to demonstrate the risks
of development (Zellmer et al. 2011).
All of these errors occurred despite the fact that decades
had passed in which to learn lessons about oil spill prevention and response. Both the 1979 Ixtoc 1 blowout in
the southern Gulf of Mexico and the 1989 Exxon Valdez
(EV) disaster in the northern Gulf of Alaska were record
spills. The Ixtoc 1 spill occurred during the drilling of an
exploratory well in 50 meters of water, causing the release of
approximately 30,000 barrels a day for 10 months, totaling
126 million gallons (Jernelöv and Lindén 1981). This was the
North American record until the DWH blowout (measured
in millions of gallons of uncontrolled oil released into the
marine environment). The EV was a single-hulled tanker
carrying 53.1 million gallons when it ran aground, spilling
almost 11 million gallons, which, at the time, was the worst
US oil spill on record.
https://academic.oup.com/bioscience

Deepwater Horizon revealed the stalled development of
technological, organizational, and regulatory preparedness
for large spills since the Ixtoc 1 and EV. For example, the
technological tools available to address an unconstrained
blowout like DWH remained relatively unchanged since the
Ixtoc 1 in 1979, but because of the unprecedented depth of
the DWH, none of the existing tools (e.g., cut-off devices,
caps, relief wells, top hats, etc.) worked. The eventual technological fix, a capping stack, existed only conceptually prior
to the DWH and was designed and implemented in response
to the disaster (Fountain 2013). When energy development
technology outpaces crisis response technology, risk—and
the economic and environmental burden of subsequent
catastrophes—is unfairly shifted from the energy industry to
ecosystems and innocent people (Kneib 2010).
At the time of DWH, the oil and gas industry was already
heavily invested in ultradeep exploration (Murawski et al.
2019). Obvious lessons from the EV and Ixtoc 1 should have
been applied to regulatory processes in the Gulf, including
the best available scientific understanding of spill prevention
and response, and preparation for the types of information
November 2019 / Vol. 69 No. 11 • BioScience 921
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Figure 1. Locations of oil platforms in US and Mexican waters, from BSEE GoM OCS Region and Centro Nacional de
Informacion de Hidrocarburos. Image: Courtesy of Gerardo Toro-Farmer and Erin Pulster, University of South Florida.
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conservation in the face of ongoing oil and gas development.
Specifically, we propose a broad, integrative pathway to conservation that considers the DWH and previous disasters
as justification for regulating oil and gas development with
a precautionary shift in the burden of proof to industry.
Our proposal is conceptual, procedural, and ideological:
Influencing the relevant research, regulatory, and legislative
processes will require shifts in values that increase support
for the well-being of marine and coastal ecosystems and the
people that rely on them.
We write from our collective experience as marine scientists active in both natural and social scientific research,
our many years of deep involvement in marine conservation policymaking at the federal level, and our recent and
ongoing involvement in post-DWH research through the
Gulf of Mexico Research Initiative (GoMRI). Following the
DWH spill, BP committed $500 million dollars to develop
an independent research program (GoMRI) focused on the
impacts of oil spills on ecosystems of the Gulf and affected
coastal states. The program’s overall intent is to improve the
fundamental understanding of these spills and their associated stresses on the environment. GoMRI includes experts
in the fields of science, public health, research administration, and outreach. From this program, the Center for the
Integrated Modeling and Analysis of the Gulf Ecosystem
(C-IMAGE) was created and continually funded for almost
10 years, investigating the various temporal and spatial
scales of an oil spill and its associated impacts. C-IMAGE
includes mechanical engineers, fluid dynamicists, modelers, sedimentologists, petro- and geochemists, toxicologists,
biologists and others, from 18 institutions in five countries,
working together to study the transport mechanisms, fate,
and impacts of deep oil spills. We (the authors of this
Forum) are among the few C-IMAGE researchers working
on either conservation or social scientific approaches to
post-DWH research.
As well, we write as current or former residents of the
Gulf Coast, with deep personal experience in the social
and ecological systems of the Gulf of Mexico. We have long
participated in and observed the circumstances we address
in the present article. It is our goal to demonstrate the value
of an integrative conservation ethic and encourage specific
strategies that enhance marine and coastal conservation
in the Gulf and elsewhere. We hope to provide thoughtful
perspectives in the ongoing discussion of conservation challenges in the Gulf and in marine and coastal systems worldwide by illustrating the diverse, interdisciplinary benefits of
proactive, well-conceived conservation. We start with a brief
exploration of the problems at hand, analyze their causes,
and recommend strategies for future action.
The marginalization of the marine environment
It has been 70 years since Aldo Leopold published his nowfamous essay, “The land ethic,” the final chapter in his collection A Sand County Almanac (Leopold 1949). Leopold called
for an integrative social–ecological ethic of conservation
https://academic.oup.com/bioscience
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needed to address a crisis (Plater 2010, Peterson et al. 2012).
Specific lessons learned and documented after the EV concerning the social, organizational, economic, and community resilience dimensions of spill preparation and response
were also either ignored or forgotten in the Gulf (Ritchie and
Gill 2010, Plater 2011, Haycox 2012).
Given this, we asked the following questions: Why was so
little progress made to improve the appropriate regulatory
and organizational structures after the Ixtoc 1 and EV? Why
were industry and regulatory authorities caught off guard
when the DWH occurred? Where is social and economic
sustainability and ecological conservation in the mix of regulatory approaches to oil-spill prevention and response? The
uncertain answers to these questions should cause those of
us working in marine and coastal science and conservation a
profound degree of contemplation and concern. Specifically,
why do our institutions fail to learn from experience in
order to protect our marine and coastal environments? And
are deficiencies likely to be remedied before the next catastrophic spill occurs?
Crises such as the DWH disaster provide opportunities for reflection and analysis from which we can learn
and apply the lessons of conservation. After the EV, US
president George H. W. Bush signed the Oil Pollution Act
of 1990 (OPA90). However, OPA90 predates the development of ultradeep oil exploration and its associated risks
by over a decade. And although regulators have reviewed
and approved ultradeep oil development, no new laws
have been passed that specifically regulate this risky area of
exploration and production. More broadly, in the aftermath
of the DWH, the United States has made little progress
in embracing either the ecological or ethical standards by
which conservation is applied to public policy in the realm
of oil and gas development. Worse, in the affected habitats,
ecological and human well-being is, regulatorily, a secondary concern to the economic drivers of oil and gas development (Costanza et al. 2010, Jacques and Lobo 2018). This
US regulatory approach favoring oil and gas development
ensures continued dependence on crisis response and ecological restoration when disasters occur, with damaging
effects. A dependence on response and restoration devalues
all services (other than oil and gas development) that marine
and coastal ecosystems provide. Institutionalizing postcrisis
restoration as a preferred conservation strategy justifies
inaction on proactive conservation measures and impedes
the kind of regulatory progress that has been achieved for
decades in other conservation arenas. This has locked in
a cycle of crisis and response that is both ecologically and
economically unsustainable.
This institutionalized dependence on crisis response
will increase the likelihood of further catastrophic crises
followed by inadequate responses, continuing a cycle of
oil and gas development that is clearly detrimental to longterm societal well-being (Freudenburg and Gramling 2011,
Tainter and Patzek 2012). In this Forum, we suggest strategies for transforming the approach to marine and coastal
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development and well-being (Worm et al. 2006, Abelson et
al. 2016).
The growth and institutionalization of postcrisis
restoration
Despite the impediments we described above, advocates
of marine and coastal protection have made strides in
advancing conservation. This has principally occurred as
ecological restoration has been elevated to a crisis response
best practice in marine and coastal systems. This heightened
awareness and attention has occurred despite the uncertainty of long-term effectiveness of restoration strategies
(Martinez et al. 2012) or a clear definition of restoration.
Understanding of restoration varies from narrow ecosystem science to broadly interdisciplinary approaches that
integrate social concerns. For example, restoration efforts
following the DWH were initially focused on ecological and
biogeochemical processes. Only later did restoration efforts
address specific economic opportunities for affected coastal
communities and other stakeholders (Deepwater Horizon
Natural Resources Damage Assessment Trustees 2016).
In a previous Forum article, Abelson and colleagues
(2016) provided perhaps the best accounting to date of
broadly integrative marine and coastal restoration. In this
foundational work, they introduced the interdisciplinary
nature of restoration in marine and coastal systems and elucidated the need for an integration of ecological with social
(i.e., moral, economic, community resilience, and many
other) variables that must occur for restoration to succeed.
Their work foreshadowed our goals in this Forum when they
stated, “Ecological restoration cannot provide a substitute
for the conservation of ecosystems, but where ecosystems
are already heavily degraded, it may be a necessary and even
a more effective management strategy” (Abelson et al. 2016).
In this Forum, we build on Abelson and colleagues’ (2016)
work by integrating it with our understanding of conservation and proposing that restoration be recognized as a critical component of conservation, but one of last resort. We
hope to demonstrate the need for conservation actions to
occur prior to crises such as the DWH in order to reduce the
need for postcrisis restoration.
Conservation and restoration have long been used effectively in terrestrial environments. Although the shift toward
proactive marine conservation and restoration paradigms
has been slow, its recognition is growing, including in our
own research community, GoMRI and C-IMAGE. Since
2012, C-IMAGE and other researchers have met annually at the Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill and Ecosystem Science
(GoMOSES) conference to discuss their findings, plans,
and the larger implications of their work. Recently, these
conferences have revealed a significant evolution in postspill
perspectives. The vast majority of funding associated with
early GoMRI studies focused on collecting data to support basic and applied research in the natural and physical
sciences. However, since 2017, ecological restoration has
become a prominent theme at GoMOSES, and sessions have
November 2019 / Vol. 69 No. 11 • BioScience 923
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and restoration to counter the then-rampant development
and degradation of terrestrial ecosystems. Leopold made
fundamental contributions to the establishment of three
fields that are of central importance to oil spill response,
especially in the wake of the Ixtoc 1, EV, and DWH: modern
conservation science, ecological restoration, and environmental ethics concerning human interactions with species
and ecosystems. These three fields, when integrated, provide
the necessary foundation for institutional response to crises
such as catastrophic oil spills.
The evolution of these three fields demonstrates the
inconsistent attention given to marine and coastal systems
outside a relatively limited community of researchers and
conservationists. Marine and coastal conservation science is
long established, with strong recognition at the federal and
international levels among government agencies, nongovernmental organizations and, increasingly, industry. Much
like ecological conservation, of which it is a part, marine and
coastal conservation is an applied, interdisciplinary science
that integrates knowledge and methods from many relevant
disciplines into an adaptive problem-oriented framework
that is designed to respond to substantial threats to ecological integrity (Norse 1993, Norse and Crowder 2005, Ray and
McCormick-Ray 2013).
Calls for a marine and coastal conservation ethic to influence policy have been appearing for decades, with prominent advocates in the research, regulatory, and conservation
communities (Siry 1984, Costanza et al. 1998, Dallmeyer
2003, Granek et al. 2005, Rau et al. 2012). This ocean ethic
literature is well founded in both science and moral reasoning (Kellert 2003, Norton 2003, Shilin et al. 2003, Wolf
2003) and was spurred by foundational work in the 1940s,
1950s, and 1960s by Rachel Carson (1941, 1951, 1955),
Victor Scheffer (1969), and others. Despite this impressive
heritage, there has been little mitigating effect on consumptive human use of marine and coastal resources other than
the passage of the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972
(MMPA) and Magnuson–Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Act of 1976. These statutes have not led to a
broader approach to marine and coastal conservation, and
calls for a new paradigm are becoming increasingly urgent
(e.g., Lubchenco and Gaines 2019). We argue, as others have
before us, that the accelerating degradation of marine and
coastal ecosystems has not been met with a corresponding shift in values or the regulatory strategies necessary to
mitigate current levels of resource exploitation. The reliance
on crisis management as the primary response in offshore
oil and gas development is a case study in the evolution
of this deeply problematic dynamic and an indicator of
the commoditization of the marine and coastal environment. Indeed, the limited set of utilitarian values typically
associated with marine and coastal systems masks a reality
well understood in the scientific community but seldom
reflected in broader societal attitudes: that protection of
marine and coastal ecosystems not only supports but is necessary for broad, long-term societal (including economic)
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profit. The tension between conservation and offshore oil
and gas development is a definitive example of this dynamic
in action and has led to a status quo approach to marine and
coastal conservation that is dangerously out of sync with
both ecological and societal needs.
The dangers of overreliance on restoration
As a conservation strategy, restoration locks in an exorbitantly costly cycle of crisis–response that is both ecologically and economically unsustainable. The great benefit of
protecting resources from crisis versus restoring them
postcrisis has long been understood, even within the oil spill
response community. Nash (2011), like Abelson and colleagues (2016), used the theory and literature of ecosystem
services to illustrate the challenges of post-DWH restoration, concluding that “avoiding future spills always beats
trying to calculate the losses afterward, and that industrial
societies have to rerig the incentives that fail to prevent
appalling carelessness” (Nash 2011: 259). This rerigging is
the regulatory change that we believe is justified by the costs
associated with restoration. In considering the role of restoration and conservation in the dynamics of oil spill response,
we look briefly at the costs of restoration in the DWH case.
Estimating the value of the full array of ecosystem services affected by any oil spill is a monumental task. Even
where values might be easily identifiable (e.g., concerning
the economic value of a specific fishery) diverse methods of
economic valuation may need to be reconciled. In the case of
the DWH, the task of accounting for affected services is aided
by the enormously useful Gulf of Mexico Ecosystem Services
Valuation Database maintained by Texas A&M University
(Plantier-Santos et al. 2012) and the US National Research
Council’s (NRC) study of the ecosystem services affected by
the DWH (NRC 2013). The NRC report is the most extensive
analysis of US marine and coastal ecosystem services to date.
Costanza and colleagues (2010) provide two illustrative
monetary examples of the DWH’s effect on ecosystem services. The first was the near-complete closure of Louisiana’s
commercial fisheries immediately following the DWH, at
an estimated annual loss of $2.5 billion. The second was
the composite value of all the services provided by the
Mississippi River Delta. Assuming “that the Mississippi
River Delta will be the most affected region and that there
will be a 10 to 50 percent reduction in the ecosystem services
provided by the delta, this amounts to a loss of $1.2–$23.5
billion per year into the indefinite future until ecological
recovery” (Costanza et al. 2010: 18–19).
Another means of estimating costs of postcrisis response
is legal settlements. Settlements are unpredictable because of
the processes that produce them, including judge and jury
trials and corporate apologia. The DWH legal settlements
totaled about $21 billion, and although the actual costs of
post-DWH restoration will not be known for years, BP estimates that cleanup costs will total $61.1 billion, including
economic losses and settlement funds allocated for restoration (NOAA 2019). These costs are contested, of course, and
https://academic.oup.com/bioscience
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explicitly addressed the restoration applications of ongoing
and future Gulf research, including those in the social realm.
The impetus for this shift was the DWH financial settlement
from BP and the resulting funding for restoration activities.
Regardless of the impetus, this was a significant shift for the
Gulf research community, reflecting important strides in the
use of natural and social scientific data to support policies
and regulations that benefit people, ecosystems, and wild
living resources.
The restoration movement that has recently developed
in the Gulf of Mexico represents an evolution in thought
and practice for these researchers. However, the word conservation is rarely used by the GoMRI community in the
conference literature, formal and informal discussions, or
publications, illustrating the conceptual, procedural, and
ideological challenges for Gulf conservation. Although there
is an absence of specific focus on conservation, GoMOSES
conferences in 2017, 2018, and 2019 highlighted an encouraging paradigm shift. In addition to presentations focused
on the advancement of knowledge about oil in the environment, sessions also highlighted the role of social transparency and engagement as interdisciplinary processes and
introduced researchers to new stakeholder groups. This
mirrors the recommendation of Abelson and colleagues
(2016) and many others before them that the scientific community needs to work conscientiously to involve diverse
stakeholders in implementing restoration strategies and to
consider how research results can support both ecological restoration and community resilience. Although these
strategies are well-worn territory for terrestrial conservation
professionals, it represents an emerging opportunity for Gulf
researchers to connect their work to conceptual and practical concerns that are being addressed by the broader marine
and coastal conservation community (Lewison et al. 2015,
Blaustein 2016, Mason et al. 2017).
As participants in GoMRI, we appreciate the growing
recognition by our community of the value of restoration.
The evolution of improved technology and field methods
has allowed restoration to become one of the most fundamentally effective tools available to marine and coastal
conservation professionals. We do not begrudge its advocates their investment in restoration, nor do we question
its effectiveness as a conservation strategy that produces
desirable outcomes that serve a broad spectrum of values.
However, we are concerned that although restoration itself
is not problematic, its success, combined with the limited
societal values about ocean life, has led to an overreliance on
this approach. This overreliance, in turn, acts as a conceptual
and procedural trap that focuses conservation and action
on postcrisis efforts at the expense of other approaches.
Restoration is a fundamentally reactive approach to conservation. Therefore, the prominence of postcrisis restoration is
desirable to industries and prodevelopment regulators. In an
example of being easier to ask forgiveness than get permission, it allows them to exploit marine and coastal resources
without having to devote time or adequate funds ahead of
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Innovating conservation in marine and coastal
systems
We believe that to address the degradation of marine and
coastal ecosystems, paradigmatic change must occur that
https://academic.oup.com/bioscience

begins with a shift in regulatory approaches to favor conservation. The first step in that paradigm change is to move restoration to its proper place in the conservation toolbox—as
a strategy of last resort—and to better integrate restoration
with a proactive approach to conservation.
The simplest and best alternative for safeguarding human
and ecological resources in the Gulf and other marine and
coastal systems is to shift the burden of proof to the industries proposing natural resource exploitation strategies,
making those industries responsible (with independent
oversight) for acknowledging, modeling, and documenting
the impacts of their proposed actions (Norse 1993, Costanza
et al. 1999 and Hofman 2009, 2010, Gabison 2012, Martinez
et al. 2012). Although it is not new, this idea grows in
urgency as the pressures and demands on our marine and
coastal systems increase. This change will require a political
solution, one that would be fueled by an ocean ethic and that
we believe is an essential long-term goal for statutory and
regulatory revision. This would be the necessary foundation
for a new paradigm for ocean and coastal management.
Precautionary regulatory structures to introduce a conservation-first approach can be developed and implemented
at the federal and state levels but will require advocacy by the
people closest to the resources in need of protection: residents, state and federal lawmakers, industry representatives,
conservation organizations, researchers, and many others.
As members of the Gulf research community, we specifically
call on our colleagues in GoMRI and elsewhere to engage
in the policy processes of conservation, advocating for the
protection of the resources on which our research relies.
A successful US precedent for this precautionary approach
to marine conservation is the MMPA, which uses ecological
criteria to assess the conservation of marine mammals and
their habitats in US waters (Hofman 2009, Reynolds et al.
2009, Roman et al. 2013). Under the MMPA, proposals for
resource development affecting marine mammals or their
habitats must undergo independent scientific review, prior
to permitting, and outside of the responsible regulatory
agencies and must meet ecological standards that require
knowledge of food webs, species’ life histories and population trends, and other baseline data. Additional precedents
include NEPA, the Clean Air Act of 1970, the Clean Water
Act of 1972, and the Endangered Species Act of 1973. None
of these is a perfect instrument, but each provides strategic
models of broadly successful conservation legislation with
applications for marine and coastal ecosystems. These laws’
implementation histories demonstrate that balances can
be achieved between industry, high standards of ecological
integrity, and community well-being, with a burden of proof
that favors a precautionary approach to conservation. Given
this legislative history, a broad conservation mandate for
marine and coastal systems is profoundly overdue.
Next steps
Many strategies are available to aid the necessary paradigm shift we seek; however, none are easily undertaken
November 2019 / Vol. 69 No. 11 • BioScience 925
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at least one economic analysis more than doubles that total
to $145 billion (Lee et al. 2018). These all may be conservative estimates, given that the annual sales of affected Gulf
Coast businesses have been estimated at nearly $2 trillion
(Dun and Bradstreet 2010).
As context for these figures, we note that OPA90 provides
for government funding of oil spill response. On OPA90’s
passage, Congress funded the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund,
the purpose of which is to pay for cleanup in the absence
of sufficient support from the liable party. Compensation
includes “damages to natural resources, loss of subsistence
use of natural resources, damages to real or personal property, loss of profits or earning capacity, loss of government
revenues, and increased cost of public services. However,
payments are limited by the available balance. For any single
discharge incident, the Fund is authorized to pay no more
than $1 billion, of which no more than $500 million may be
paid for natural resource damages (OPA 9001(c); 26 U.S.C.
§ 9509)” (USCG 2017: 2).
Given that $1 billion would not cover even 1/60th of the
costs of the DWH damages, it is clear that the federal government is not well positioned to support necessary restoration efforts. Reliance on corporate responsibility is subject to
the vagaries of the legal system, illustrated by both Exxon’s
decades-long court battle to avoid paying for the EV cleanup
and BP’s agreement to fund restoration at a level nowhere
near what will likely be needed. Nevertheless, these are the
procedures we have institutionalized: We rely on postcrisis
restoration, the success of which requires financial resources
beyond those available (even if every legal challenge is
decided favorably). This institutionalized postcrisis restoration must be supported by decades of cooperation among
countless stakeholders, including elected officials who will
come and go with each election cycle. And given our understanding of marine ecosystems, all of this will fail to produce
any certainty that restoration will lead to a desirable future
with a steady state of ecological integrity (Nash 2011).
We find ourselves in this predicament because, societally,
our dependence on oil and natural gas has compelled us to
bestow on its development an at-all-costs status that profoundly overmatches our efforts to protect any other values
we derive from marine and coastal ecosystems. This imbalance is untenable and is what leads us to our belief, shared by
Lubchenco and Gaines (2019) and others before us, that we
need a new narrative, an ocean ethic. Just as Leopold’s land
ethic was the inspiration for generations of conservation
legislation and regulation that has helped us to protect our
terrestrial ecosystems, we believe an ocean ethic will provide
us with similar inspiration. This will allow us to match the
scope of responsibility placed on us by the species and ecosystems of our oceans and coastal zones.

Forum

Acknowledgments
This research was made possible by a grant from The Gulf
of Mexico Research Initiative/CIMAGE II, no. SA 12–10.
We are grateful to Shannon Spencer and Steven Murawski
for thoughtful input and direction during the drafting process, to our C-IMAGE colleagues who we spoke with as we
prepared the manuscript, and to three anonymous reviewers
for their extensive and constructive comments on earlier
versions of the manuscript. Authors RLW and SG also wish
926 BioScience • November 2019 / Vol. 69 No. 11

to express their lifelong gratitude and admiration for their
coauthor and friend, the late John E. Reynolds III, whose life
and career serve as a continuing inspiration for our work.
References cited

Abelson A, et al. 2016. Upgrading marine ecosystem restoration using ecological–social concepts. BioScience 66: 156–163.
Alexander K. 2011. The 2010 Oil Spill: MMS/BOEMRE and NEPA. U.S.
Congressional Research Service.
Blaustein R. 2016. United Nations seeks to protect high-seas biodiversity.
BioScience 66: 713–719.
Carson R. 1941. Under the Sea Wind. Simon and Schuster.
Carson R. 1951. The Sea around Us. Oxford University Press.
Carson R. 1955. The Edge of the Sea. Houghton Mifflin.
[CEQ] Council on Environmental Quality. 2010. Report Regarding the
Minerals Management Service’s National Environmental Policy Act
Policies, Practices, and Procedures as They Relate to Outer Continental
Shelf Oil and Gas Exploration and Development.
Costanza R, et al. 1998. Principles for sustainable governance of the oceans.
Science 281: 198–199.
Costanza R, et al. 1999. Ecological economics and sustainable governance
of the oceans. Ecological Economics 31: 171–187.
Costanza R, Batker D, Day Jr JW, Feagin RA, Martinez M, Roman J. 2010.
The perfect spill: Solutions for averting the next Deepwater Horizon.
Solutions 1: 17–20.
Dallmeyer D, ed. 2003. Values at Sea: Ethics for the Marine Environment.
University of Georgia Press.
Deepwater Horizon Natural Resources Damage Assessment Trustees. 2016.
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Final Programmatic Damage Assessment
and Restoration Plan and Final Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement.
Dun and Bradstreet. 2010. 2010 Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Preliminary
Business Impact Analysis for Coastal Areas in the Gulf States.
Fountain H. 2013. Lessons from the Exxon Valdez oil spill. New York Times.
(24 June 2019). www.nytimes.com/2013/12/09/booming/lessons-fromthe-exxon-valdez-oil-spill.html.
Freudenburg WR, Gramling R. 2011. Blowout in the Gulf: The BP Oil Spill
Disaster and the Future of Energy in America. MIT Press.
Gabison GA. 2012. Limited solution to a dangerous problem: The future
of the Oil Pollution Act. Ocean and Coastal Law Journal 18: 223–254.
Granek EF, Brumbaugh DF, Heppell SA, Heppell SS, Secord D. 2005. A blueprint for the oceans: Implications of two national commission reports
for conservation practitioners. Conservation Biology 19: 1008–1018.
Haycox S. 2012. “Fetched up”: Unlearned lessons from the Exxon Valdez.
The Journal of American History 99: 219–228.
Hofman RJ. 2009. The continuing legacies of the Marine Mammal
Commission and Its Committee of Scientific Advisors on Marine
Mammals. Aquatic Mammals 35: 94–129.
Jacques PJ, Lobo R. 2018. The shifting context of sustainability: Growth
and the world ocean regime. Global Environmental Politics 18: 85–106.
Jernelöv A, Lindén O. 1981. Ixtoc 1: A case study of the world’s largest oil
spill. Ambio 10: 299–306.
Kellert SR. 2003. Human values, ethics, and the marine environment.
Pages 1–18 in Dallmeyer D, ed. Values at Sea: Ethics for the Marine
Environment. University of Georgia Press.
Kneib RT. 2010. Oiling the wheels of system change. Frontiers in Ecology
and the Environment 8: 227.
Lee YG, Garza-Gomez X, Lee RM. 2018. Ultimate costs of the disaster:
Seven years after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Journal of Corporate
Accounting and Finance 29: 69–79.
Leopold A. 1949. A Sand County Almanac. Oxford University Press.
Lewison R, et al. 2015. Dynamic ocean management: Identifying the critical ingredients of dynamic approaches to ocean resource management.
BioScience 65: 486–498.
Lubchenco J, Gaines SD. 2019. A new narrative for the ocean. Science
364: 911.

https://academic.oup.com/bioscience

Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/bioscience/article-abstract/69/11/920/5556086 by guest on 22 July 2020

or adequately resourced. Establishing a baseline scientific
understanding of marine and coastal systems is a necessary
first step. Historically, the Gulf has suffered from inadequate funding for system-wide baseline studies. Assessing
the damage of any traumatic event can only occur in the
framework and knowledge of preimpact conditions. In the
Gulf, GoMRI has provided much-needed funding, and the
C-IMAGE consortium has collected data throughout the
Gulf, as well as from Mexico and Cuba. This is important
because these ongoing studies can assess the overall ecological health of the Gulf, identify regions most at risk or susceptible to future oil spills, and can pinpoint areas of significant
vulnerability. This type of approach should be adopted proactively for all marine and coastal systems, not implemented
only when prompted by disaster.
Almost 10 years of GoMRI-funded research offers insights
into the impacts of oil spills on marine mammals, sea turtles,
fish, microbes, corals, benthic environments, and a host of
other marine organisms and habitats. But although catastrophic events like the DWH are extensively documented,
this has not led to more effective conservation. To broaden
the scope to include a larger conservation context, GoMRI
is currently funding research that looks at the impacts of
large catastrophic spills on marine ecosystems and the
well-being of human stakeholders. Embracing this dual
approach as a core value is a necessary step for the marine
and coastal research community. Ultimately, we believe that
this approach will lead to the acceptance of conservation,
broadly envisioned, by many diverse stakeholders in the
Gulf and other marine and coastal communities.
The shift toward conservation in marine and coastal
resource development is a vital part of ongoing national and
international efforts to elevate the importance of conservation policy to the point where stakeholders will demand federal and state action. Our experience of the DWH suggests
a way forward, with lessons that are broadly applicable. Our
current statutory and regulatory processes have afforded
disproportionate benefits to specific interest groups, placing our natural ecosystems and coastal communities at risk.
We seek to change these processes so that they protect and
benefit all stakeholders. Every progressive statute in the
environmental arena has had a groundswell of support by
diverse stakeholders, and this case is no different. With the
necessary support, we can influence passage of conservation policy for the sustained benefit of marine and coastal
ecosystems and their residents, human and nonhuman alike.
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